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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 10-4468 
______________ 
 
MAMADOU NBAYE, 
(a/k/a AMADOU KORKA DIALLO), 
 
       Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
       Respondent 
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of the Decision and 
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA No. A097 520 789) 
Honorable Grace A. Sease, Immigration Judge 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 6, 2011 
 
BEFORE:  McKEE, Chief Judge, and FUENTES and 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
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(Filed:  October 20, 2011) 
______________ 
Randall L. Johnson 
Johnson & Associates 
2000 Clarendon Blvd. 
Suite 201  
Arlington, VA 22201 
 
     Attorneys for petitioner 
 
Eric H. Holder 
Attorney General 
Thomas W. Hussey 
Tony West 
Assistant Attorney General 
Civil Division 
Ada E. Bosque 
Senior Litigation Counsel 
Puneet Cheema 
Trial Attorney 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station 
Washing, D.C. 20044 
 
     Attorneys for respondent 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 This matter comes on before this Court on a petition for 
review of a decision and order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) dated October 29, 2010, denying petitioner 
Mamadou Nbaye’s motion to reopen his proceedings seeking 
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 
Convention Against Torture based on changed country 
conditions in Guinea, his country of origin.  He filed that motion 
seeking reconsideration of the BIA’s denial of his earlier motion 
to reopen and reconsideration of the earlier orders denying him 
relief.  This case has a long history which we need not set forth 
in detail.  Rather, it is sufficient for us to point out that Nbaye 
sought to enter this country with a stolen French passport on 
February 22, 2005, but was intercepted at that time.  
Subsequently, numerous proceedings ensued arising from the 
Department of Homeland Security initiating removal 
proceedings against him.  In these proceedings, Nbaye sought 
the three types of relief we listed above, as he claims to fear 
returning to Guinea because he believes that if he returns he will 
be persecuted on account of his political opinion attributable to 
his membership in the Rally of Guinean People Party (“RPG”).   
 Nbaye consistently has been unsuccessful in the 
numerous proceedings that followed his unlawful entry into this 
country, and has been subject to an administratively final order 
of removal since December 12, 2005.  Nevertheless, he remains 
in this country.  In its October 29, 2010 decision and order the 
BIA held that to the extent Nbaye’s filing then before it was a 
motion for reconsideration of a decision denying a prior motion 
for reconsideration, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 barred the motion.  To the 
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extent that Nbaye was seeking a reopening of the proceedings, 
the BIA denied Nbaye’s motion because:  (1) he had not shown 
that there was a change in country conditions in Guinea that was 
material to his claim, and (2) the motion was both time and 
number barred.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(c).  Nbaye then filed the petition for review now before 
us. 
 During his convoluted proceedings, Nbaye has contended 
that he has been subject to persecution because of this 
involvement with the RPG.  In his presentations, Nbaye has 
included evidence that a military junta rather than the RPG was 
in power in Guinea on September 28, 2009, and that it 
massacred its political opponents on that day.  In the current 
proceedings, Nbaye summarizes his argument as follows: 
 
 The Board decision dated October 29, 
2010, is manifestly contrary to law and an abuse 
of discretion.  The BIA abused its discretion in 
finding that the conditions in Guinea were 
substantially the same for RPG members after the 
September 2009 massacre.  The Petitioner’s 
evidence submitted in his motion to reopen clearly 
shows a change in treatment of opposition party 
members in the wake of the September 2009 
massacre. 
 
Petitioner’s br. at 11. 
 
 In the course of our review of this case, it came to our 
attention that since December 2010 when there was a change of 
government, the RPG has been the governing party in Guinea.  
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Naturally we questioned whether this change in government 
undercut Nbaye’s claim for relief, as he clearly attributed his 
persecution to his involvement with the RPG.  Consequently, we 
had our clerk address a letter to the attorneys on this appeal 
which in material part reads as follows: 
 
The Guinea People Party (“RPG”) recently came 
to power in Guinea.  The Petitioner, a member of 
the RPG has repeatedly sought asylum and 
withholding of removal for fear of persecution 
based on political opinion.  Counsel for the parties 
are directed to submit letter briefs . . . addressing 
the impact, if any, the changed political 
circumstances in Guinea have on Nbaye’s claim 
for relief and also addressing why the matter 
should not be remanded to the [BIA] to consider 
the changed country conditions. 
 
 The attorneys have filed the letter briefs as we directed.  
Nbaye contends that we should grant his petition for review on 
the current record or, alternatively, should remand the case to 
the BIA for consideration of the new evidence, since the record 
has closed on the petition for review now before us.  The 
Attorney General responded that we lack jurisdiction to consider 
evidence of changed conditions in Guinea that occurred after the 
BIA’s decision because our review is limited to consideration of 
the existing administrative record.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(b)(4)(A).  The Attorney General further contends that 
Nbaye is not entitled to relief on the current record and thus 
there is no need to remand the case.  Accordingly, the Attorney 
General argues that it would be futile to remand the matter for 
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further proceedings.  Significantly, the parties’ briefs confirm 
that the RPG has come to power. 
 
 We recognize that our precedents demonstrate that we 
have declined to take judicial notice of materials not in the 
record on petition for review in removal cases, see Wong v. 
Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 234 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008); Borishaj v. 
Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 330 (3d Cir. 2004), and we further 
recognize that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) requires that a court of 
appeals decide a petition for review of an order of removal only 
on the record on which the order was entered.  On the other 
hand, we are aware that other courts of appeals have asserted 
that they have discretion to take judicial notice of changes in 
political situations that have occurred after the issuance of an 
order of removal.  See Hoxhallari v. Gonzalez, 468 F.3d 179, 
186 n.5 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).  It seems to us that it would 
be myopic to ignore the circumstance that the RPG has come to 
power in Guinea inasmuch as Nbaye attributes his persecution to 
membership in that party. 
 
 We have concluded that although we cannot decide the 
case on the basis that there has been a change in power in 
Guinea, our precedents and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) on the one 
hand and the seemingly appropriate way to proceed in this 
matter on the other can be accommodated by remanding the case 
to the BIA so that it can consider the change in power in Guinea. 
 After all, by remanding the matter for BIA’s consideration of 
the change in power we neither would be approving nor 
rejecting the BIA’s decision and order.  See Borishaj, 378 F.3d 
at 330.   
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We realize that the Attorney General contends that it 
would be futile to remand the matter because, even without 
regard for the change in government, Nbaye cannot prevail in 
his effort to avoid removal.  We, however, reject this basis for 
avoiding remand as it is possible, though we do not express an 
opinion on this point, that based on the current record we could 
grant Nbaye substantive relief on his petition for review but that 
on remand the BIA may determine that the change in 
government precludes Nbaye from obtaining relief.  In that 
scenario the remand surely would not have been futile.  Rather, 
it would have been outcome determinative. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition for 
review to the limited extent that we will vacate the October 29, 
2010 decision and order denying Nbaye’s motion but do so 
without prejudice to the BIA reinstating the decision and order 
on the remand.  Thus, we do not base the vacation of the 
decision and order on our assessment of the merits of Nbaye’s 
petition.  On the remand the BIA should consider the possible 
effect of the change in power in Guinea. 
 
 No costs will be taxed in these proceedings. 
 
